Progressive Aspect and Perfection in Situation Semantics by Lee Ik-Hwan et al.
Progressive Aspect and Perfection
in Situation Semantics*
Ik-Hwan Lee, Jong-Do Kim (Yon-sei University)
Kyung-Ae Choi (Ewha University)
1. Introduction
According to Vendler (1967), verbs in English may be classified into four
classes on the basis of the criterion of internal temporal structures of an
event: namely, activities, accomplishments, achievements, and states. Freed
(1979) added a 'series' to the list and Langacker (1982), on the different
criterion of trajectories, gave different names: i.e. perfective, imperfective
and stative. We see different criteria may give rise to different categories
names, but Vendler's classification provides a starting point.
Vendler dichotomised verbs, according as they can have progressive form.
One group with the progressive form includes accomplishments and ac-
tivities, while states and achievements belong to the other group without
the progressive form. Dowty noticed that two classes, accomplishments and
activities behave differently in their interactions with the progressive aspect.
Several linguists including Dowty have tried to resolve this problem within
the framework of formal semantics. Let us have a close look at the prob-
lems arising in the interaction between the two classes of verbs and the
progressive aspect.
The first is how to deal with the so-called 'continuum failure', as Abusch
(1985) named it. Someone who walks, reads for a particular interval doesn't
mean that he walks, reads at every moment in that interval. Furthermore,
the sentence John was building a house doesn't mean that he was building
at every moment. Like this, a 'continuum failure' indicates the absence of
the relevant action.
The second is the so-called 'imperfective paradox' (Dowth (1979)). In
the case of activities the progressive form and its simple tense counterpart
entail each other, while such a relation doesn't exist in the case of ac-
complishments.
In this paper we will review how linguists have dealt with these problems
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and discuss their merits and demerits. Then we will try to suggest a better
analysis, on the basis of Barwise & Perry's (1983) situation semanticts and
many insightful suggestions hinted at in Hinrichs (1983). Hinrichs emphasiz-
ed the importance of the notion 'INTEND' in the analysis of the progressive
form. However, he does not include it in the truth-conditions of PROG.
We propose the notion 'INTEND' be inserted into the truth-conditions.
In that way, we will claim, formal semantics may incorporate the
psychological aspects of meaning. We will give several arguments in order
to back up this claim. In the new analysis we will also make use of Meulen's
(1985) observations. By so doing, our analysis will suggest how formal
semantics may use the psychological aspects in a proper treatment of the
problems of 'continuum failure' and 'imperfective paradox' .
The paper is orgainzed as follows. In Section 2, we will review previous
studies. In Section 3 we provide some substantial evidences for accepting
`INTEND' as a semantic primitive. In Section 4 we illustrate our analysis
with several examples. A summary and conclusion will be given in Section 5.
2. Previous Studies
Let us look at the se atence given in (1).
(1) John was pushing a cart.
(2) [PAST [PROG [John pushes a cart]]]
IN Dowty's (1977, 1979) analysis, (2) is a logical representation of (1).
This logical form assumes the following: first, the progressive form can
be analysed within the framework of the traditional formal semanticts; se-
cond, the progressive form can be formed with the composition of a PROG
operator and a simple sentence; and, their idiosyncratic phenomena related
to the progressive form are irrelevant to a particular tense. Accordingly,
the meaning of PROG may be specified independently and contribute to
the meaning of the whole sentence. These assumptions can predict all the
phenomena brought about by an activity verb, but not those by an ac-
complishment verb as illustrated in (3) and (4).
(3) John was drawing a circle.
(4) John drew a circle.
According to the compositionality principle, (3) should entail (4), but
the entailment fails. This problem is called 'imperfective paradox' (Dowty
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(1979)). He thinks it is an important problem which one must solve before
he analyzes the progressive form. Dowty thinks (1) is different from (3)
not in the operator PROG, but in the verbs themselves. 'Push a cart' is
an activity, while 'draw a circle' is an accomplishment. An accomplishment
verb differs from an activity verb in that the former has a hidden consti-
tuent BECOME. Therefore, (1) is represented as [PROG +] in logical form,
whereas (3) is represented as [PROG [BECOME +]]. As to accomplishment
verbs, PROG is true in case [BECOME +] is true. This hidden BECOME
gives rise to the imperfective paradox.
Dowty considers PROG as a modal-temporal operator, the truth-
conditions of which must be based on intervals and possible worlds. His
notion of interval is that an interval consists of densed linear moments
without blank and can be divided into subintervals. He establishes the truth-
conditions of PROG on the basis of a subinterval from which the last mo-
ment of the interval is excluded.
Dowty discusses the necessity of the notion of possible world. Consider
the following sentences:
(5) John will draw (draws, drew) a circle.
(6) John will be (is, was) drawing a circle.
Those who utter (5) assert that a circle exists already or will exist, whereas
those who utter (6) believe that the existence of a circle is a possible result
of John's action. Then, the meaning of PROG can be shown under the
assumption that + is true in a possible world.
Dowty's possible world necessary for specifying the truth-conditions of
PROG is called an inertia world which consists of interval I' and possible
world W'. In this world, the progressive action at the evaluation point will
be completed, following the 'most natural course' and the future time bran-
ches after the evaluation point. I is a subinterval of I' and W is an actual °
world which is exactly like W' up to the evaluation point. An inertia world
is related to the actual world by means of a function Inr. The following
is Dowty's truth-conditions of PROG based on these conditions.
(7) [PROG +] is true at <I, W> iff for some interval I' such that I C I' and
I is not a final subinterval for I', and for all W' such that W'EInr (<I,
W>) + is true at <I', W'>.
(7) can predict the imperfective paradox with the help of the hidden
constituent and meaning postulates, but is not good enough to satisfy
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Hinrichs (1983). He points out a couple of problems in this analysis.
One of them is illustrated with (8):
(8) John was crossing the street when he was hit by a truck.
Under Dowty's analysis, two incompatible informations must be in-
cluded in the inertia world, which is exactly like the actual world up
to the evaluation point. Unless a miracle happens two incompatible
events can not be completed in the same possible world.' Hinrichs says
the best way to avoid such a contradiction is to convert Inr to a partial
function, but it is impossible, because Dowty's analysis is provided under
Montague's framework in which only a total function is assumed.
Therefore, the progressive form can be analysed better within the
framework of the situation semantics founded on a partial function than
within Dowty's framework.
Another problem with Dowty's analysis, as Hinrichs points out, is
that some events can be completed through various processes. This con-
tradicts the notion of 'the most natural course'. Let us see (9):
(9) John was making Bill a millionaire.
The processes by which John makes Bill a millionaire are not unique.
We can not know which course is the most natural. According to
Hinrichs, these problems can be solved easily within the situation
semantics.
In situation semantics, meaning is assumed to be systematic relations
between an utterance situation and an actual situation. Accordingly all
the meaningful situations are captured in terms of situations which con-
sist of individuals, property or relation, and polarity. Sets of situations
plus sets of locations constitute a course of events. 2 A course of events
is a partial function from locations to situation types. A course of events
implies a change of meaning through some locations. A real situation
like (9) is represented as in (10)-(11):
(10) John kisses Mary.
(11) e: at 1, kisses, John, Mary; yes
In (11), that John stands in kissing relation with Mary at 1, is true,
but many other situations are irrelevant except those represented in (11).
Such an assumption is possible in situation semantics because all func-
tions are partial in it. Unlike in Dowty's framework a meaningful op-
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tion is fixed in terms of systematic relations between situations with
the assistance of setting, and constraints. The most important factor
in fixing a meaningful option is structural constraints.
Barwise and Perry claim that structural constraints establish
systematic relations between situations and that they can fix a mean-
ingful option. B & P's constraints are involvement relations between
event-types, as illustrated in the form of (12):
(12) Co: at 1 u , involves, E, E'; yes
Using (12), the fact that kissing always means touching can be
represented as in (13):
(13) Co: at lu , involves, E, E'; yes
E: at 1, kisses, a, b; yes
E': at 1, touches, a, b; yes
We see some similarities between the traditional notion of entailment
and that of constraints. According to B & P their difference lies in that
.entailments are the relations between linguistic expressions but that con-
straints are relations between situations.
Let us now consider how Hinrichs analyzes the progressive form. In his
analysis, (14) is represented as (15).
(14) John is writing a letter.
(15) e: at l', intend, John, (write-a-letter, John); yes
at I", piece-of-paper, a; yes
typewriter, b; yes
at 1"', put-in, John; yes
where l'<1"<1"'
Dowty does not accept 'INTEND' as a primitive because it is not
necessary and sufficient, 3 but Hinrichs thinks it is an important notion
because a progressive form conventionally implies that an agent has intent.
As can be seen, the interval in which an event is in the progress can be divided
into several locations, where different situations are related. A certain in-
complete event represented in the form of a course of event at the discourse
location (/d) can be related to a certain complete event (course of event)
by means of structural constraints. Beyond the evaluation point situation
sementics does not commit to any supposition about what will come of the
action in progress. With these conditions in mind, Hinrichs postulates the
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truth-conditions of the progressive form, as in (16):
(16) 6, (PROG (Re), a„ 	  an) =1 iff there exists an extension
6'gc5*(the complete actual world) such that
(i) I is in the domain of 6' and no later location is the domain of 6' and
(ii) there is a constraint C: <at /u: involve, E, E': 1> and 6' realizes
	
E and 6" relaizes E' and (R n , a„	 	  a„) =1 for 1C 1".
(16) is formulated taking Dowty's analysis into consideration. The con-
dition (i) is necessary for Dowty's analysis because he presupposed a hid-
den constituent BECOME, but we do not see any reason to retain it. An
actual situation realized as. E and another one realized as E' which doesn't
necessarily belong to the actual world are connected with each other through
constraints.
In this analysis, Meulen (1985) observes two problems. First, in situa-
tion semantics, an event consists of relation, individual and polarity. Then
what is PROG (R n)? What is the difference between R„ and PROG (R„)?
Relations may be constituents of an event, and they can not be graded or
split into parts unless we change the underlying set-theory and introduce
a universal part-whole relation between semantic entities. Second, 6' and
E are not specified. As parts of an action are actualized at I in 6', E does
not include any indeterminate. Then, for instance, (17) must be represented
as in (18):
(17) John was writing a poem.
(18) 6' = <1: PROG (write), j; 1>
In (18) a part of a poem must be included. This reflects our intuition.
If it doesn't include any part of a poem, how can it be related to a com-
plete poem realized in E'?
On the other hand, Cooper (1985) tried to solve this problem by regar-
ding a progressive VP as unlocated complex properties and BE as a con-
nector between the subject and unlocated complex properties. In addition
to these devices, he needs constraints to structure atomic facts and rela-
tions between (in)determinate locations. However, Meulen (1985) thinks
these devices are not satisfactory because sets of atomic facts are porperly
included by other sets of atomic facts set-theoretically in situation seman-
tics. For these reasons the progressive form can solely be accomodated in
terms of the universal part-whole relations.
Meulen added another reason for treating the progressive form as a part-
whole relation. Look at the sentences in (19)-(20):
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(19) Whenever John was crossing the street, Jane was.
(20) Whenever John crossed the street, Jane did.
In (19) two crossings can overlap temporarily and start or end respec-
tively at a different time, but in (20) John's crossing must precede Jane's
temporarily. In (19) two crossings overlap and are symmetric, but in (20)
John's crossing is introduced as a temporal antecedent for Jane's and two
crossings are asymmetric. 4 This difference lies in the representation of the
progressive form and its simple tense counterpart. If an incomplete event
can be regarded as a part of a complete event, such an entailment naturally
follows.
For the reasons put forth above, Meulen thinks more structures are need-
ed in the domains in order to explain the progressive form as a part-whole
relation than Montague assumes in his PTQ. She thinks all the semantic
entities are made up of parts, out of which new entities can be made. She
thinks two operations are in action in the domain; one is the join-operation,
U E and the other is the part-of relation <E . These operations work like
(21) i4E iff.
Meulen thinks, like Hinrichs, an event consists of relation (Rn), in-
dividuals (i), and polarity and that its form is like <<Re ,
	 	
in>pol>.
Any individual can be an indeterminate, including relations, and if any one
of individuals is an indeterminate in the event, it is a part of an event, an
incomplete event. An incomplete event is related to the complete one through
the universal part-whole relation. She boasts that such an analysis can ex-
plain a cumulative progressive form which neither Hinrichs' nor Dowty's
framework can. Let us consider sentence (22):
(22) More and more people are liking Seattle.
In (22) each part is thought to be accumulated into one whole event. Each
part can be independent at any stage. Thus the action in progress need not
be related to a particular corresponding complete event. Dowty's imperfec-
tive paradox does not arise in Meulen's analysis.
Meulen (1984) tries to account for the phenomena by distinguishing be-
tween homogeneous referring expressions and heterogeneous referring ex-
pressions stipulated by four closure conditions.' She thinks the distinction
can easily explain the 'imperfective paradox'. However, she does not discuss
state verbs and achievement verbs that do not seem to allow progressive
P,
P2
P2
P4
XL x„
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form.
According to Meulen (1984), an activity verb constructs a homogeneous
event composed of divisible entities, while an accomplishment verb creates
a heterogeneous event made up of indivisible entities. And the problem of
`imperfective paradox' is confined to the heterogeneous event only.
For example, let us see the case of (1) (repeated here for convenience):
(1) John was pushing a cart.
With an activity verb such as 'push', the following figure may show the
situation where the whole process is divided into many parts, e.g. 13 19 P2
• • • P5, XR XL:
(23)
Each part is homogeneous. Therefore, the progressive form in (1) which
comprises both X R and X, entails the past form 'John pushed a cart' which
contains only XL.
On the other hand, sentence (3) which includes an accomplishement verb
is an indivisible entity that can not be represented as in (23). This is a
heterogeneous event. All parts of the whole event form a descending chain
of ever finer processes that go for some finest process, a goal of event.
Therefore, the whole does not entail the part, and the only point at which
the whole event can be identified is when the goal of that event is com-
pleted (in the case of sentence (3), at the moment the circle is completely
drawn). After all, by interpreting the activity denoted by the phrase 'push
a cart' as a homogeneous event, and the accomplishment denoted by 'draw
a circle' as a heterogeneous event, we can predict the 'imperfective paradox'.
That is, the 'imperfective paradox' arises in a heterogeneous event only.
On the other hand, according to Meulen (1984), state verbs satisfy only
closure condition (i), but achievement verbs make atomic events satisfying
conditions (i) — (iv) in all. For instance, the verb 'knock' which makes
an atomic event is interpreted on a smallest, indivisible interval, i.e. a
moment.
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(25) He was knocking on the door for 10 minutes.
Because (25) denotes an activity continuing for the time of 10 minutes, it
can be illustrated as in (23). But, while, in the case of (1), the activity does
not allow any interval between parts, there may exist such intervals in (25).
Meulen's way of analysis is confronted with the problem of the 'empty in-
terval' . This is apparent in (26):
(26) He was building his house.
There may exist many intervals in the process of the activity of 'building
his house', and these intervals must also be parts of the whole event. But,
can the whole entail the empty part?
Meulen (1984) does not discuss state verbs and achievement verbs which
are not considered to allow progressive forms in general. But, as shown
in the sentences in (27), achievement verbs (like win (27a)), and state verbs
(like understand in (27b)), can have progressive forms (Mourelatos (1978)):
(27) a. He is winning the race.
b. I'm understanding more about quantum mechanincs as each day
goes by.
A perceptual verb doesn't seem to denote a simple state, as shown in (28):
(28) I'm hearing buzzing sounds.
Therefore, the way of analysis adopted by Meulen must abandon the
classification of verbs proposed by Vendler(1967). Or it should be modified
and extended to be applied to state verbs and achievement verbs, and to
incorporate the semantic notion of empty interval in the analysis of pro-
gressive form.
In the following sections, we try to solve the above problems with the
help of Hinrichs' notion of 'INTEND'. Before providing a formal represen-
tation of the notion, we first discuss its importance.
3. Intent: Psychological Aspects.
In the previous section, we reviewed previous studies and discussed their
merits and demerits. In the course of the discussion, we have implicitly
hinted at the necessity of a psychological consideration toward a natural
solution of the problem. In this section, we will provide a couple of substan-
tial evidences for the necessity.
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(24) He knocked on the door.
But, in the case of (24), the situation is somewhat different.
3.1 Empty Interval.
Dowty's notion of time is that time can be divided intervals made up
of linear moments. Under this notion empty intervals (or moments) may
not be allowed, during which no action occurs. In order to avoid these empty
intervals Dowty postulates an additional condition in his truth-conditions
of PROG. His extra condition is that [PROG 1] is true with respect to I,
one of subintervals subsumed by I', a large interval. Later, as a possible
solution to the problem, Cooper weakens Dowty's notion of time so that
a location (a spatio-temporal notion of situation semantics) may exist if
an event occurs. The existence of a location depends on whether an event
occurs or not. Accordingly, if a location is relevant to an event it exists, and
if not it doesn't. Thus irrelevant locations may exist between relevant loca-
tions. Under Cooper's analysis, the continuum failure or empty intervals
do not bring in any problem. But Cooper does not discuss locations in rela-
tion to any psychological relevance.
Let us examine the notion of the 'empty interval', or 'continuum failure'.
(29) John built a house.
The proposition denoted by (29) can be true even if the activity of 'building'
is not taking place at every moment. At the moment when no activity ex-
ists, the continuum of action fails. We will use 'empty interval' instead of
`continuum failure', which connotes some undesirable implication. The
empty intervals which can appear in (29) are not systematic or regular, but
accidental.
These empty intervals are of a different sort, which are regular and
systematic. Consider (30):
(30) John knocked at the door.
The event denoted by (30) consists of a series of subevents, among which
empty intervals appear regularly as illustrated in (31):
• • • •
Progressive Aspect and Perfection in Situation Semantics
	 87
(31) (Real Time) 
event
empty interval
	 subevent
The empty intervals in (30) are different from those in (29) in regularity
and systemacity. Furthermore, even if the empty intervals in (29) are miss-
ing, the event can be a whole, while if those in (30) are missing, the event
can not be established. In the case of (29), empty intervals are neither
necesary nor sufficient parts, but in the case of (30) they are necessary.
Speakers evaluate the relevance of all the parts in their minds. The parts
are judged not to be of equal status.
Still another kind of empty intervals can arise from the perfective form.
Let us take (32) into consideration:
(32) John has seen a lion.
The interpretation of the event denoted by (32) makes use of more than
one subevent, empty intervals and the notion of 'relevance' to the present.
In (32) empty intervals are neither regular nor systematic. But unlike those
in (29), they are necessary parts. In this event, subevents and the notionof
`relevance' are important, but empty intervals are ignored, i.e. not given
any psychological relevance.
According to Meulen's analysis of the progressive form, every part of
an event is the same in respect of relevance. Such a notion of hers can not
accept an empty interval as a part though it satisfies her criterion. As we
see, some empty intervals are relevant to the event, but some are not. Meulen
hints at the necessity of incorporating psychological aspects into the for-
mal semantics. However, she does not elaborate how this can be achieved.
The traditional formal semantics claims that any semantic entity must
be atomic and objective. Meulen tries to attack the atomism with powerful
weapons: namely, the part-whole relation and the join-operation in the do-
main. As we pointed out above, however, some parts are not relevant to
the event and are different in the degree of relevance. Therefore, the part-
whole relation can not resolve the problem. In order to solve this problem,
we suggest formal semantics be comprehensive enough to incorporate
psychological aspects of meaning into its framework. We think this will
lead to another violence to the other myth of formal semantics, objectivism.
We, however, think speakers judge subjectively whether or not any part
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of an event is relevant to the whole event. Let us see the following sentence:
(33) John was building a house.
John decided to build a house, asked someone to draw a blue print and
started to build. From what moment can (33) be valid? From the moment
to decide or to ask? Speakers' subjective judgement decides which parts
of it are relevant.
Meulen claims that an incomplete event in the progressive form is a part
of the complete event denoted by its corresponding simple tense form. Then
how can a speaker identify the part with a part of the whole event? When
one comes up to a situation, how can one identify it with a part of an event
that a person is drawing a house instead of a donkey?
In the following subsection, we give another substantial evidence which
argues for the necessity of incorporating psychological aspects into the for-
mal semantics.
3.2 Progressiveness of Stative Verb
In general, it is considered that verbs can be classified into two disjoint
classes depending upon whether or not they can have progressive forms;
namely, non-stative verbs vs. stative verbs. In particular, Quirk (1973) asserts
that verbs must be classified in such a way as to reflecting the contrast bet-
ween 'progressiveness' and 'non-progressiveness'. He called verbs allow-
ing the progressive form dynamic verbs, while verbs not allowing it stative
one. Accordingly, (34) and (35) are the examples of dynamic verbs, while
(36) and (37) are those of stative verbs:
(34) a. John carefully searched the room.
b. John was carefully searching the room.
(35) a. It rained steadily all day.
b. It was raining steadily all day.
(36) a. The girl is now a student at a large university.
b. *The girl is now being a student at a large university.
(37) a. John knew the answer.
b. *John was knowing the answer.
Some stative verbs, however, can be used as dynamic ones and have pro-
gressive forms, as Quirk et al. (1973) observes:
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(38) He is being a f nuisance again
naughty f
For example, in (38), taking the dynamic complement 'a nuisance' and
`naughty', the verb 'be' is used dynamically, and it has the progressive form.
Furthermore, according to Quirk et al. (1973), some progressive forms
of stative verbs which do not take the recipient subject belong to the dynamic
class, and the progressive form is allowed as in (39).
(39) a. I think of you.
b. I'm thinking of you.
Though the progressiveness of stative verb as in (38) and (39) can be treated
exceptionally, the previous argument that progressiveness is defined in terms
of stativeness and vice versa is clearly circular. Moreover, it does not seem
that the possibility of using progressive forms depends upon verb classes
of the sort observed in Section 2.
Comrie (1976) has provided a clue to the solution of this problem. Ac-
cording to him, the contrast between progressiveness and non-
progressiveness is related to the internal structure of situation.' In this paper,
extending Comrie's suggestion, we assume that the possibibility of using
progressive forms depends not upon the distinction between the stativeness
and activity of verbs but upon the speaker's internal/external viewpoint
of the situation.
Consider example (40):
(40) You aren't hearing.
Comrie thinks that (40) is ungrammatical. Let us assume that the speaker
takes situation denoted by (40) as an unanalyzable whole with the external
viewpoint. Then, (40) is an impossible sentence, as Comrie predicts. On
the other hand, if the speaker has the internal viewpoint so that he takes
the situation (40) as an analyzable whole from the situation-internal point
of view, (40) is a possible sentence. It has an internal temporal structure.
In Section 3.1., we assumed that only the relevant element must be taken
into consideration in order to analyze the meaning of utterance in our
framework. The relevant element which make (40) grammatical is the
speaker's perception of the internal temporal constituency of the situation
at hand.
In this context, (36b) and (37b), which Quirk et. al. think are ungram-
matical, can be regarded to be grammatical depending upon the situation,
i.e. upon what the relevant element is. In (36b), we can imagine that 'the
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girl' is a student who studies at 'a large university' during the day and a
waitress who makes money to prepare her school expenses in the evening.
In this case, she becomes a student in the daytime. In order to interpret
(36b) as a correct one she needs to become a student, and the speaker must
be in the situation-internal position. That is, when the speaker utters (36b)
implying that she becomes a student iteratively at a particular time every-
day, he perceives the particular time as a relevant element, namely, the
`daytime', and (36b) can be interpreted as a correct sentence. The meaning
of the whole consists of each of the relevant parts that she is a student only
in the daytime, and the speaker perceives the internal temporal constituen-
cy of that situation. Therefore, as in the case of 'knock', the progressive
form (36b) has the iterative meaning by which the homogeneous event is
characterized.
In (36a), on the other hand, the speaker utters the only external fact that
the girl goes to a large university. The uttered external fact is an unanalyzable
whole and does not have any internal structure.
(37a, b) can also be explained in a similar way. Furthermore, Quirk et.
al. asserts that the progressive sentence (38) may be acceptable because of
the dynamic quality of its complement. In our framework, however, (38)
is allowed because the speaker utters it perceiving the internal temporal struc-
ture in the utterance situation. In other words, w.z: can imagine that the sub-
ject 'He' is performing some activity the qu' y of which is 'a nuisance'
or 'naughty' before the speaker. Thus, the spe:4ker can perceive the inter-
nal termporal structure of that activity.
Next, look at the sentences in (41).
(41) a. I live at 6 Railway Cuttings.
b. I'm living at 6 Railway Cuttings.
In (41), the same kind of explanation is possible. (41a) simply refers to the
external fact as a whole that the subject "I" lives at 6 Railway Cuttings
expressed in the perfective aspect. (41b) is uttered by the speaker perceiv-
ing the internal temporal constituency of utterance situation. Thus (41b)
may mean that the speaker has been living at 6 Railway Cuttings for some
time before the reference point and that he will live at 6 Railway Cuttings
by some time after the reference point. This interpretation arises from the
speaker's perception of the internal structure of utterance situation.
In Section 2, we noted that (27) gave rise to a problem. The problem
now can be accounted for in our framework.
(27a) is a heterogeneous event which consists of processes going toward
a goal, and the speaker utters (27a) perceiving the internal structure of the
situation which consists of processes going toward a goal of 'winning'. In
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our analysis, only the relevant element in the situation is taken into con-
sideration, and in (27a) the relevant element is the internal temporal con-
stituency of the situation denoted by (27a).
(27b) is also a heterogeneous event in which each process is going toward
a goal of 'complete understanding' and the collection of each process gives
the meaning of the whole. In this case, again, the relevant element is the
internal temporal constituency of the situation.
Now let us consider (42):
(42) The car was stopping.
In (42), (though 'stop' is not a stative verb) as 'stopping' can not have an
internal structure in any case by a constraint, the progressive form is not
possible.
After all, whether verbs can have progressive forms or not depends upon
whether they can have an internal temporal structure or not irrespective
of the traditional classification of verbs.
So whatever the verb class may be, the meaning of the sentence in the
perfective aspect is regarded as an indivisible whole, not referring to the
internal temporal constituency. On the other hand, the meaning of the ut-
terance in the imperfective aspect is the collective meaning of its parts in-
cluding the beginning, the middle, and the end in relation with the speaker's
perception of the internal temporal constituency of the uttered situation.
In this case, the whole is divisible into many parts. Moreover, as the rele-
vant viewpoint of the situation is in the situation itself, the internal tem-
poral structure is patently transparent. That is, the imperfective aspect can
not be used in the situation without the internal structure. Therefore, though
the verb is stative, if the progressive sentence is related to the situation with
the internal structure and the speaker has the situation-internal viewpoint,
then the progressive form is possible.
Then, how can this kind of analysis be combined with the framework
of situation semantics? On the basis of Hinrichs' interpretation, we can
extend the conception of 'INTEND'. He used 'INTEND' in analyzing the
meaning of progressiveness as in (15), because in the progressive form an
agent has intent. This conception can be used more widely to include the
meaning of the situation-internal viewpoint of an agent or a speaker in our
framework. So, we introduce 'IND' as an extended notion of 'INTEND',
which was rejected by Dowty at the outset. We will elaborate the formaliza-
tion of some examples incorporating the primitive 'IND' in Section 4.8
Furthermore, this analysis seems applicable to Vendler's achievement
verbs and state verbs as well. If this line of our observation is correct, the
classification of verbs on the basis of stativeness or progressiveness seems
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to be meaningless.
4. Sample Representation.
In Section 3, we provided a couple of arguments to the effect that seman-
tic entities in a domain exist subjectively rather than objectively. These
arguments led us to incorporate psychological aspects into the framework
of formal semantics. Until Barwise and Perry introduced situation seman-
tics, however, there had been no serious attempts to accomodate some
pragmatic or psychological aspect with the framework of formal seman-
tics. In a sense, situation semantics is an attempt to introduce the
psychological aspect as a part of the mechanisms of formal semantics. B
& P do not demonstrate any concrete device to incorporate a psychological
aspect into the framework of the formal semantics, but provide a theoretic
basis, on the basis of which Hinrichs tries to provide an analysis of the pro-
gressive form. In his analysis, he used the notion 'INTEND' which Dowty
rejects. He does not make clear where it comes from and what status it
stands on in his framework. We think this notion can be employed as a door
through which psychological apects come into the framework of formal
semantics. For this purpose, Hinrichs' notion of 'INTEND' is too narrow
and we think it is necessary to widen its scope.
We assume 'IND' is not a lexical item, but a semantic primitive with
which we can properly interpret various situations. Let us see what kind
of functions it may have.
In Hinrichs' analysis, the notion 'IND' is understood as a mean, by which
a speaker recognizes whether or not an agent has intention to perform the
activity being done by him. In this paper we adopt Hinrichs' version of
`IND'.
Another work imposed on the primitive 'IND' is to fix the speaker's
perspective of the situation: namely, whether it is dynamic or stative. In
order to achieve this purpose, 'IND' can make use of pragmatic elements.
One more function we hope 'IND' to bear is to impose some relevance
to the parts of an event. This function is licensed by a speaker's subjective
judgements and other pragmatic elements as we pointed out in the previous
section. To summarize, through 'IND' we think many things can be ex-
pressed: e.g., how to view a situation, how semantic entities are structured
and whether or not the internal temporal structure of an event is relevant
to the specific communication.'
As pointed out above, Hinrichs does not include 'INTEND' in his truth-
conditions. We revise Hinrichs' formulation and represent it as follows:
(43) 6, (PROG (R.), a 1 , 
	
 a,,) =1 iff there exists an extension d' 6*
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(the complete actual world) such that
(i) IND, a, E, where a may be included in E as an agent or another
agent b and where the indeterminate location 1 in E can be any
location of the locations of e.
(ii) there is a constraint C;<at 1: involve, E, E' :1> and 6' realizes E
and 6" realizes E' and 6;' (Rn, a 1 , 	  an) =1 for 1 C 1".
Comparing with the original version, one may notice that we leave out
Hinrichs' condition (i) for the reason we explained in Section 2. In its place
we insert the new 'IND' condition. (We use the contracted form 'IND' for
the notion 'intent' as a primitive.) We claim the primitive 'IND' can
cooperate with the pragmatic component. This point is not expressed ex-
plicitly in the present formulation. Our analysis is based on situation seman-
tics. Within its framework such a function is performed by constraint.
We are now in a position to provide our analyses of a few sentences with
the postulated truth-conditions of the progressive form. Let us see the ex-
ample in (44), repeated here for convenience:
(44) John was pushing a cart. ( = (1))
(45) e: = at 1, IND, John, E
E: at 1, push-a-cart, a; yes
John, a; yes
at l', of -cart, b; yes
at 1", push, a, b; yes
where 1<l'<1"
We assume 1 indicates an indeterminate location and can be any location
in e. In this case a speaker judges that the agent of 'IND' and that of 'push'
are the same. Let us see another sentence in (46):
(46) John was drawing a circle. ( = (3))
(47) e: = at /, IND, John, E
E: at 1, draw-a-circle, a; yes
John, a; yes
at l, of-pencil, b; yes
piece-of paper, c; yes,
at 1", draw, a, b, c; yes
where 1<l'< 1"
Dowty argues that 'push a cart' and 'draw a circle' are analyzed different-
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ly. To this problem Hinrichs answers. We don't feel it necessary to repeat
his argument here.
Next, let us take an ambiguous case which neither Hinrichs nor Meulen
mentions in their respective analyses. Look at the sentence in (48) and its
first possible interpretation in (49):
(48) John was building a house. ( = (26))
(4 9 )e; at 1, IND, John, E.
E; at 1, building-a-house, a; yes
John, a; yes
at 1, materials-of-house, b; yes
John, a; yes
of-house, c; yes
at I", build, a, b, c; yes
where 1<r<1"
In the case of (49), the agent of 'IND' and the agent of 'build' are the same.
Another possible interpretation of sentence (48) is given in (50):
(50) e: at 1, IND, John, E.
E: at 1, build-a-house, a; yes
working, a; yes
at 1, materials-of-house, b; yes
workers, a; yes
of-house, c; yes
at 1", build a, b, c; yes
where 1<r<1"
In (50), the agent of 'IND' is different from that of 'build'. Unspecified
workers realize John's 'intent', which is captured by the primitive 'IND'.
In this process the pragmatic factors provide helps to the primitive. B &
P imposes this job to the constraints.
(51) is another interesting case, which other previous investigators do
not deal with intentionally or unintentionally. Let us consider (51):
(51) I'm living at 6 Railway Cuttings. ( = (41b))
(52) e: at 1, live-at-6-Railways-Cuttings, a; yes
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speaker, a; yes
at 1, live a; yes
where 1<1'
In this case 'speaker' is concerned with the internal temporal structure of
an event. In the form of an incomplete event he intends to express his tem-
porary living at the place. The notion 'IND' implies the internal perspec-
tive of the speaker.
In the case of homogeneous event (44), there's no difference from
Hinrichs' analysis except 1. In (47), (49), and (50), the activitis of 'draw
a circle' and 'build a house' may includeempty intervals'. Even when come
location 1 is posited at some empty interval, as the agent 'John' collects
the only relevant parts as the meaning of the sentence making use of
`IND', irrelevant parts are not taken into considertion. In particular, by
formalizing as in (49) and (50), an activity of building a house can be per-
formed not only by the subject John, but also by some workers John may
hire. In (52), the state verb 'live' implies the internal perspective of the
speaker and the definite short period of 'living at 6 Railway Cuttings'.
5. Summary and Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to achieve the general semantic interpreta-
tion of perfect and imperfect aspects in English with a particular reference
to the 'imperfective paradox' within the framework of situaition semantics.
In Section 2, we surveyed the previous studies by Dowty(1979),
Hinrichs(1983), Meulen(1984,1985) and Cooper(1985), and discussed some
problems of their assertions. Investigating various arguments, the introduc-
tion of a psychological aspect was considered to be necessary. In Section
3, we provided a couple of substantial evidences for the necessity of in-
troducing psychological elements into formal semantics. For formalization,
we made men's mind projected in the notion of 'INTEND' which was
originally suggested by Hinrichs. The extended notion of 'INTEND' which
we represent as 'IND' is a device to pick up the relevant elements in human
mind, and it is utilized in the effective interpretation of progressive sentences.
In Section 4, we provided sample analyses of progressive sentences with
the notion of • 'IND' .
To conclude, we hope to have shown the effectiveness of B & P's situa-
tion semantics with the suggested revision and extension, in providing a
proper treatment of the progressive aspect in English.
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Notes
This is a revised and expanded version of the paper we presented
at the 5th Korean-Japanese Joint Workshop on Formal Grammar
(August 19-21; Yonsei U, Wonju Campus). In preparing this ver-
sion, we have benefited from kind comments and criticisms by
Akira Ikeya, Akira Ishikawa, Ki-yong Lee, Byung-soo Park, and
Susun Yoo. We deeply appreciate their insightful suggestions. Any
defects in what follows, however, are all our own.
1. Cf. Hinrichs(1983;173). Dowty thinks inertia worlds indentical to the
actual world up to the point of evaluation. And he assumes that
the action in progress will be completed in the inertia world.
Therefore hitting and crossing must be completed there, which is
impossible.
2. Cf. Barwise & Perry(1983;56). A course of events is a set of
triples(1,y,i), where 1 is a spatio-temporal location, y is a consti-
tuent sequence (r,X	 X,7) and i is 0 or 1. They think of coe
as a partial function from loctions to situation-types.
3. Dowty(1977;46) thinks the progressive form of an accomplishement
verb can not be defined in terms of the intention of an agent. He
explains this by two examples: one case where a ninety-year-old
composer can say his activity as writing a symphony without in-
tending to complete it and the other where there are progressive
forms of accomplishments that have no sentient agent who can have
such an intention.
4. Cf. Meulen(1985;415).
5. Cf. Meulen(1985;416). According to Montague any semantic entity is
atomic i. e. indivisible. On the contrary Meulen claims any entity
is divisible and wants to relate any entity to its constituent parts.
6. Four closure conditions stipulated by Meulen(1984) are as follows:
i) V xEX dyEP (x g y—yEx)
ii) V x, yEX zEX (if x, yE[[R1] then
zE[[R]] and z x and z c y)
iii) Nit x x 1 EX (if x—dec (x 1 , x 1 , x3) and
x 1 , x 1 , x2E[[R]] then either x 1 ,.X or x2EX)
Progressive Aspect and Perfection in Situation Semantics 	 97
vi) xEX yyEP yEP (y	 yEX)
7. We assume that the internal phases of the situation are referred
to by the imperfective aspect. Particularly in situation semantics,
this internal structure can be easily formulated with locations.
8. As observed by Ishikawa Akira, one may question about the seman-
tic content of the notion 'IND'. In our framework, however, 'IND'
is an extended notion of Hinrichs 'INTEND' and used in a more
abstract sense.
9. By this, we mean that the mental aspect suggested by Barwise and
Perry (1983) may be understood in a broader sense, including a
psychological aspect. On this point, we thank Akira Ishikawa and
Byung-soo Park for their helpful comments.
10. As observed by Ki-yong Lee and Susun Yoo (when this paper was
presented), one may suggest that the jobs we required to be per-
formed by the semantic primitive 'IND' be carried out by the
function originally devised by Barwise and Perry(1983) in their
book, Situation and Attitudes. But, the notion of 'IND' has a scope
wider than the function in the sense that while a function works
in a sentence level to pick up a meaningful option, the IND may
work in a sublexical level as well, So, we may say that the delta
function is a part of 'IND'.
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